Prologue
In the latest session of the House of People’s Representatives (HoPR) a huge round of applause echoed when PM Abiy Ahmed said: “Let the world hear today, Ethiopia maintains a clear national interest; it needs Red Sea access through peaceful means”. In view of the existing pro and anti-Prosperity Party politics in Ethiopia one would be tempted to reject PM Abiy’s declaration as one of the Party’s tricks intended to influence the people to its side. When the fact that Prosperity Party takes a lion’s share of the seats in the HoPR is added into it suspicions about the real motive would grow two fold. This is understandable in view of the fact that experiences in Ethiopia for over a century show that access to the sea has been more a matter for politics rather than a crucial issue of justice. While Ethiopia deserves access to the sea, if truly justice is to be served, political leaders through the ages have used and abused it as a key card in the political game for power. Is PM Abiy determined to abandon the beaten-track of the politics of access and dare to walk on the “bush-path” in the quest for justice? Time will tell!
History of Politics in Ethiopia vis-à-vis Access to Sea Part I
It has for very long become customary to begin tracing the history of present day Ethiopia from the Axumite Kingdom; although this is relevant to the former Kingdom of Abyssinia in general and the core region lying within a thousand kilometers onshore from the Red Sea in particular. However, in view of the prevalent attitude most Ethiopians share not only about access but also about ownership of the huge southern segment of the Red Sea, Axumite history has come to be a point of departure in any analysis pertaining to Ethiopia‟s access to the sea. Axumite Kingdom was the hub of regional and international networks of trade that integrated markets in the Mediterranean Basin, southern Arabia, India and the Far East. Axum was so enabled because of its mastery over the Red Sea. It was not only Axum and its immediate hinterland that enjoyed access to the sea. Tradable commodities from the interior of present day Ethiopia found their way to the international market through the Axumite Red Sea port of Adulis.
Hundreds of years later Axum’s domination over the Red Sea declined. The main reason for the beginning of the decline was the challenge posed by the rise of Islam in the Red Sea region. It was Christianity, at the height of the glory of Axum that helped the seedling of Islam to establish. The irony is that it was the turn of Islam not to help but to end Axum’s presence in the Red Sea. According to Donald Crummy Axumite shipping disappeared from the Red Sea; the Aksumite state turned southward conquering adjacent grain-rich highlands; monastic establishments moved even farther to the south; and over time, the Agew in the southern edge of the Kingdom learned Geez, became Christian, assimilated the Axumites, and transferred the Capital from Axum to Lasta. In the Centuries that followed, until the second half of the 19th Century, isolation from the rest of the world, monasticism, civil wars, violent internal movements of people, and most archaic form of feudalism did not allow Ethiopia to turn its attention to regaining access to the sea. In the absence of external trade of significance, except for the importation of firearms by feuding kings and regional warlords, Ethiopians had no appetite for access to the sea. They might have felt safer the farther away they were from the sea.
Even if they had felt the need to guard the Red Sea coastline the absence of arable land in the arid and semi-arid Red Sea coast would have made it impossible for them to populate the littoral. It was not only the forbidding landscape and climate of the southern Red Sea coastal region but also its distance from the new centers of power in central and north central Ethiopia that might have stimulated the disinterest in that part of the then Abyssinia. The extensive mountainous terrain enroute to the Red Sea, the excessive heat in the Danakil formed impregnable natural barriers for to and from movements on foot and on mule-back The absence of any threat from the kingdoms in the region south of the Red Sea emboldened the expansion of Islam which almost encircled the deeply Christian Kingdom of Abyssinia. For Ethiopia the nearest access to the sea was the port of Zeila in the Gulf of Aden. Even this was controlled by Islamic Sultanates in the East. Wars had been going on for many years between the Christian Highlanders and the Adal Sultanate in the East. For over 800 years after the decline of Axum and the consequent loss of access to the Red Sea Ethiopia remained deeply isolated.
History of Politics in Ethiopia vis-à-vis Access to Sea Part II
Nearly after a millennium the ice of access to the sea was broken by no other than a king from the former Axumite core region. The rise of Emperor Yohannes IV of Ethiopia from present day Tigray unearthed the interest in the Red Sea from where it was buried deeply in the hubs of political power in central and north-central Ethiopia. This was in the 1870s and 1880s. The years coincided with the first half of what came to be known as the “Age of New Imperialism” (1870- 1914) following the second industrial revolution in Europe. European nations sought industrial inputs and markets from Africa, the Middle East and Asia. European powers, notably Britain and France were hugely enabled to control the Red Sea by the decline of the Islamic empire and the opening of the Suez Canal creating convenience for shipping to Asia in half the distance of the one around the Cape of Good Hope, South Africa. The Suez Canal was opened a year before the coronation of Yohannes IV. He was destined to rule Ethiopia in a new era of Imperialism. Yohannes IV prevailed over the highland interior of the Red Sea coast by appointing his army chief Ras Alula to govern what is now the independent state of Eritrea, However, as a marine thoroughfare of the key European powers of the time Red Sea and its 1150 km southern coastline was not available for him. Britain was in Egypt, Sudan, Yemen and Somaliland. France was a lesser power situated strategically in the Gulf of Aden‟s Bay of Tajura. The fateful purchase of a “trading post” by Italy from the sultan of Assab was the first spot to trigger a chain reaction of Italian occupation of present day Eritrea which marked the beginning of the end of Ethiopia‟s access to the sea. Any incursion on the part of Yohannes IV into the Red Sea coast required the consent of the powerful British Empire. In the Hewett Treaty (Adwa Treaty) between Britain, Egypt and Ethiopia in 1884 the Emperor first demanded for a sea port for Ethiopia, but he was forced to settle for a free transit for all goods, including arms, through the port of Massawa.
Soon after the agreement was ratified, and Ethiopia did its part of the agreement Egypt evacuated from Massawa to allow Italy to occupy it with tacit British approval. The betrayal ignited a series of clashes between Italians and Yohannes IV. In spite of the successes over Italians by Ras Alula and Yohannes IV, in a few battlefields, all attempts to dislodge Italian troops from the coastline failed. The Hewett Treaty was a two edged sword. On one side Italians were allowed to occupy the coast with a longer term intention of invading Ethiopia. The other side facilitated Italian advance into the highlands using the opportunity created by the departure of Yohannes IV to Metema to fight the deep Mahdist incursion into Gondar. The Mahdist rebellion against Egypt had encircled and isolated several Egyptian garrisons. When Yohannes IV allowed the Egyptian garrisons to evacuate to Massawa through Ethiopian territory Mahdist leader considered Ethiopia as his enemy and attacked it from the west. This way Britain eliminated its rival Yohannes IV.
Yohannes IV not only lost access to the Red Sea but also lost his life in the battle of Metema (Gallabat). The quest for access to the Red Sea was not pursued by his successor to the throne: Menilik II. When Yohannes IV was fighting Italians on the Red Sea littoral the powerful vassal king in central Ethiopia was neither interested in access to the sea in the north nor wanted to be hostile to the Italians. All he wanted was to be next on the throne after Yohannes without “kicking the beehive” of Red Sea politics. He bypassed his emperor and established friendly relations with the Italians on the Red Sea coast. He was awarded with arms to help him challenge Yohannes IV and conquer the west, the south and the east of present day Ethiopia. Stationed deep in central Ethiopia and running a feaudal economy, which is inward looking, Menilik cannot be expected to risk his ambition to be the next emperor of Ethiopia by involving himself in a war with Italy to secure access to the Red Sea. He may have computed the opportunity cost in the context of what the time demanded. After Yohannes IV died in Metema fighting the Mahdist forces his heir to the throne in the then Tigre province was reluctant to claim the throne based on the Emperor’s will. King Menilik acted swiftly and was crowned Emperor of Ethiopia.
Access to the Red Sea now became the responsibility of Menilik II. The new Emperor was more worried about what could brew in the then Tigre province vis-à-vis the throne of Ethiopia than pushing out Italians from the Red Sea coast. He must have been sleepless about the possibility of the heirs of Yohannes IV importing arms through Massawa to remove him from the throne. Rather than appeasing the nobility in the north he preferred the stick to the carrot and decided to block the access to the sea for them. In a few months after his coronation Menilik II signed to cede the entire highland and coastal region of the Red Sea to the Italians by way of Article three of the Wuchale Treaty. Neither did Menilik have access to the sea in the east. The French had established a colony in the Gulf of Tajoura, after a series of land purchases from the local sultans, long before Menilik came to the throne.
Menilik II considered the claimants of the Ethiopian throne in the north as a greater threat to his rule than the Italians he willingly installed at his door step. He trusted a European colonial power to abide by the Wuchale Treaty and stay put, in the relatively unproductive coastal strip, gazing at the bounty in Ethiopia from that distance! As any ordinary mind could expect Italians used the godsend land north of Mereb to freely prepare for the invasion of Ethiopia. Despite the stiff resistance they faced from the opponents of Menilik II in the north Italians pushed south as far as Alaje Raya. Menilik II lost the Red Sea access in order to save the rest of Ethiopia from the Italians. Now he seemed to be on the verge of losing all. The Emperor quickly mobilized most Ethiopians against Italy; and it was the Battle of Adwa. Although the Battle of Adwa alarmed the whole world, a backward African state defeating a European colonial power, it did not help Ethiopia regain access to the Red Sea. Italy had violated the Wuchale Treaty by invading Ethiopia. However, the Emperor of Ethiopia fell short of restoring the pre-Treaty status quo with regard to Ethiopia’s sovereignty over the Red Sea coastal territory. By so doing Menilik let Italians stay on his land for 40 years to freely prepare for the reinvasion of Ethiopia in the next generation. The five years of Italian occupation of Ethiopia had turned Ethiopia into an Italian East Africa merged with Eritrea and Somalia.
The virtuous scenario for Ethiopia would have been if Menilik had supported Yohannes IV when he was betrayed by the British and Egypt allowing Italy to occupy Massawa; and/or if Menilik had helped Yohannes IV with the Mahdists in the west, the history of Ethiopia’s access to the Sea could have taken an entirely different shape. The justice for access to the sea that Ethiopia is now denied evolved from the imprudent political rivalry between the nobility in the north and the monarchy in the center. Rather than breaking the vicious cycle of political rivalries and collaboratively create a virtuous cycle to work for the common good of gaining access to the Red Sea, throughout the century after the Battle of Adwa rulers in Ethiopia cared less about the fate of their great grandsons and great granddaughters. They never saw even in their dreams that Ethiopians would be a hundred million souls locked in a giant geopolitical prison. The withdrawal of Italians from Ethiopia and the end of WWII did not automatically restore Ethiopia’s right of ownership of the Red Sea coastal territory. One of the victors of WWII Britain preferred to retain „Italian Eritrea‟ under its control. It seemed that the British, who had betrayed Yohannes IV and denied him access to the Red Sea, were in a mood to repeat their harmful action on Ethiopia. They could not digest the possibility of Ethiopia owning a thousand kilometers of Red Sea coast and be a power in the Red Sea as Axum had been a thousand years ago. They consider Ethiopia, which did not succumb to European colonialism, as an ever shining symbol of their failure.
Return of the Red Sea Territory to Ethiopia as a ‘Gordian Knot’
By the time the United Nations was founded and the allied victors in WWII decided in favor of the federation of Eritrea with Ethiopia, the political, social-psychological and economic state of affairs in the Red Sea coastal territory had changed forever. Most people in Ethiopia must have got the wrong idea that for over half a century under Italian colonial rule what Ethiopia calls its “Bahre Negash” territory would remain petrified as politically, social-psychologically and economically Ethiopian. Although colonial rule in the Red Sea territory in what Italy christened as “Eritrea” was as hard as it is expected to be former Axumites who now named themselves Eritreans not only tolerated Italian rule but also served it and readily absorbed Italian political and economic culture. The divergence of the Eritrean society from the Ethiopian society in this regard was unmistakable. If there was Ethiopian political and cultural identity of some sort among Eritreans before Italian colonial rule that was irreversibly lost. The fact that “Bahre Negashites” were handed over to Italian colonialism by Ethiopians was a reason sufficient for harboring a deep grudge against Ethiopia. At the same time, Eritreans found Italian colonial rule to be a more advanced polity than the backward feudal order in the rest of Ethiopia. The expansion of modern urbanization, industrialization and employment opportunities in the non agricultural economic sectors was what Eritreans who for centuries eked out a living from low productivity agriculture found stimulating. The relative harmony between the colonial rulers and the ruled would permanently sever the umbilical cord that connected Eritreans with Ethiopians in general and their neighbors in Tigray in particular. In its federation with Eritrea, Ethiopia got a political Gordian knot to untie most wisely if it really wanted to secure permanent access to the Red Sea. As Ethiopian rulers undermined the extent of the complexity Eritrean society evolved under Italian colonialism and ten years of British rule, issues of political power were given priority over long term generational benefits of access to the sea.
What the decadent monarchy in Ethiopia feared most in the federated Eritrea was its multi-party democratic political system. This real threat to the monarchy could possibly incite rebellion in Ethiopia against feudalism. Ethiopian rulers from central Ethiopia, who for over half a century all but forgot about the Red Sea territory they voluntarily ceded to Italy, were trying to clean their own mess but in the wrong way. They dreamt of pulling Eritrea back to feudalism in Ethiopia by ending the federation and at the same time securing access to the Red Sea. Ethiopian rulers, this time led by Haile Selassie I, were thoughtlessly trying to hit two birds with one stone. The logical outcome of the primacy of politics over wisdom was cutting the „Eritrean Gordian Knot‟ through violence and oppression on the Eritrean society. For 15 years before the 1974 military coup in Ethiopia Eritreans fought for liberation from Ethiopian rule. For the second time Eritreans were not to blame; greed for power in Ethiopia was! Ethiopia controlled the Red Sea coastline, built a naval force and became a Red Sea power. Was this sustainable? It was very far from it; violence could not sustain a peaceful tenure over the Red Sea coast for Ethiopia.
The military that overthrew the Monarchy in Ethiopia was worse on Eritreans than the monarchy that used a combination of carrot and stick. This time it was all stick aggravating the armed struggle for the liberation of Eritrea. The Junta in Addis Ababa was busy pulling all kinds of outdated narratives about the Ethiopian historical possession of the Red Sea coastline; as if that former part of Ethiopia was like a photograph frozen in time. It was expected of the Military rulers to be milder than the Monarchy and play more effective appeasement tactics with the Eritrean society. When the Military killed a key Eritrean, closed the Kagnew Station, confiscated Italian and Arab big businesses, and sent angels of death to terrorize the youth in Eritrea, people flocked to the liberation movements pressing the button for the irreversible escalation of the war in the north. This was the third disastrous political mistake done on the part of Ethiopia which more severely disappointed Eritreans.
The TPLF Factor in Ethiopia’s Access to the Red Sea
The analysis of the role TPLF played in the issue of Ethiopia’s access to the Red Sea should be preceded by some background discussion pertaining to what warlords in Tigray were doing, vis à-vis their colonial neighbor in the north, for decades before Italian occupation of Ethiopia. When Menilik II ceded the Red Sea coastal territory to Italy there was no opposition in Tigray of any significance. Tigray warlords were busy fighting one another and frequently travelling to Addis Ababa to lie about one another to Menilik II, Zewditu and Haile Selassie I. Of course, in the aftermath of the Battle of Adwa, Ras Mengesha Yohannes and Ras Alula are said to have begged Menilik II to give them permission to remove Italians from the coast. Apart from this warlords in Tigray seemed to have felt at ease with the presence of Italians in what they say is a significant part of the ancient Axumite Kingdom. Some used the Italian colony as a more convenient route to Addis Ababa by ship from Massawa through Djibouti every time they were summoned by Menilik II and later by Haile Selassie I. They were also using the Italian colony of Eritrea as refuge to hide from the wrath of higher authority. Many of the Tigray warlords had forged strong relations with the Italian authorities in Eritrea. Every time they fight one another some sought help from Italians others appealed to authorities in Addis Ababa. There is a striking similarity to what is happening now in Tigray. While Ras Seyoum resisted Italian invasion of Ethiopia, his rivals Dejat. Gebre Sellasie and Dejat Haile Selassie befriended the Italians in Eritrea. Worse, the latter led Italian troops to Mekelle; the Capital of the arch enemy of Italians!
Military rulers of Ethiopia used violence as the only strategy to secure access to the Red Sea and there was no sign that they would abandon the strategy in favor of a more peaceful approach. The more violent the war in Eritrea became the more intractable the Eritrean problem turned out to be. It is hypothesized by many that the founding of the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) was the workmanship of the Eritrean People‟s Liberation Front (EPLF) with the intention of diverting the focus of the Ethiopian military away from EPLF. This was a short-term strategy; but for the long run TPLF was meant to be Eritrean proxy at Arat Kilo after independence. Once war between TPLF and the Ethiopian military came to a full swing the survival and victory of both EPLF and TPLF depended on each other’s existence. TPLF‟s survival depended on the recognition of the independence of Eritrea as a “colony of Ethiopia”. TPLF leadership fashioned all kinds of Marxist-Leninist justifications to underpin the colonial narrative. In fact, EPLF differed in how it wanted TPLF‟s armed struggle to come to a conclusion. Although TPLF called itself a liberation movement, and this implied that Tigray in the end will be an independent state, EPLF had another plan for TPLF. EPLF did not want Tigray to be independent; it advised rather pressurized TPLF to collaborate with other political forces in Ethiopia and form a coalition government that would give green light to Ethiopia’s vast resources and huge market for future independent Eritrea. Inconformity was fatal for TPLF.
It was believed that without the support of EPLF Ethiopian military would easily wipe out TPLF. In view of the critical survival issue TPLF paid dearly in the lives of thousands of its fighters to serve EPLF. Moreover, it even tolerated the intolerable when Eritrean forces caused the death of thousands of Tigray famine victims by blocking the route to relief aid centers in the Sudan. The blind servitude to the Eritrean cause of the leaders of TPLF evaded conventional wisdom. Military rule in Ethiopia was not selectively dangerous to Tigray. In fact, most of the Military government’s wrath was directed at the Gondar and Addis Ababa based EPRP. TPLF was acting strangely by fighting against EDU and EPRP which could have been its allies in its war against military rule. It was not all in the ranks of TPLF leadership that subscribed to the Eritrean independence agenda. Sebhat Nega and Meles Zenawi, who led TPLF for more than half of its existence during the armed struggle, were more “Catholic than the EPLF pope”. In at least two purges the two leaders systematically mobilized TPLF fighters against top leaders who opposed Eritrean independence. A question arises as to why political leaders of the TPLF were so keen about Eritrean independence while this meant that the Ethiopia they were grooming themselves to rule would be losing its access to the sea. If they were really advocating for the economic interest of Tigray as the name of the armed group implies isn’t Tigray the number one beneficiary from access to the Red Sea? The rationale for TPLF to advocate for Eritrean independence remained mysterious.
The TPLF Paradox: Ruling Ethiopia and Harming Ethiopia
In 1991 Ethiopia’s War in Eritrea and Tigray ended with EPLF controlling all of Eritrea and TPLF controlling all of Ethiopia. It was unusual for a regional liberation movement to control the capital of the state it fought against to liberate its region, As it happened in Eritrea, in which EPLF controlled Asmara not Addis Ababa, TPLF was expected to restrict its military operation to control the regional capital of Tigray. Tigray Liberation Front was not a synonym for „Ethiopia Liberation Front‟. TPLF controlling Ethiopia defeats the mission of the TPLF the group fought for 17 years. If from the outset or later TPLF aimed to rein over Ethiopia its name was erroneous to say the least. In fact, the name TPLF was deliberately coined to mobilize Tigray nationalist fervor for the leadership to control power in Addis Ababa and assist the liberation of Eritrea. The two goals, the attainment of which consumed the young generation of Tigray, were not mutually exclusive. Eritrean independence required TPLF at Arat Kilo for its realization. EPLF openly declared that it was them who installed TPLF in the Menilik Palace to facilitate independence and the subsequent „counter-colonization‟ of Ethiopia by Eritrea.
TPLF, the diligent envoy of EPLF in Addis Ababa wasted no time to prepare the groundwork for Eritrean liberation while the people of Ethiopia became passive spectators of the sick unpatriotic drama. As Meles Zenawi, TPLF‟s absolute leader and EPLF‟s most trusted hand used all legal, administrative and diplomatic instruments to ensure Eritrean exit from Ethiopia, Ethiopians concluded that Tigrayans were murdering Ethiopia by denying it access to the Red Sea. No one can imagine that Ethiopians, who have always put Ethiopia’s access to the sea at the top of the list of national interest, would endorse the imprudent action of the TPLF leaders with regard to Eritrean independence. The worst part of TPLF‟s generous sponsorship for Eritrean independence was disallowing loopholes for retaining access to the sea proposed by notable Ethiopian politicians outside TPLF. If TPLF squatting on the Ethiopian throne had honestly felt helpless in the face of EPLF to fight for Ethiopia’s national interest it could have allowed, supported and facilitated for other Ethiopians to try their luck to secure access to the sea.
Haile Slassie I the Monarch and Mengistu the dictator risked everything and fought to the last to secure access to the Red Sea for Ethiopia. Mengistu could have ruled for 30 more years if he had allowed the independence of Eritrea. There was no other challenge to his rule other than that. The series of coups against him were related to the way he handled the Eritrean issue. During the Monarchy and the dictatorship that followed Eritreans were hurt more by the social psychological warfare than by the armed conflict that raged in Eritrea. The Ethiopian side of Eritrean politics was characterized by a clear lack of foresight and indiscriminate arrogance towards all Eritreans. Alongside the reference to Eritreans as “Agamido” many in Ethiopia unpatriotically said: “What we want is the ports, not the people of Eritrea”. With all certainty such kinds of callous statements wouldn’t convince Eritreans to feel Ethiopian. In the „hardware‟ and „software‟ arenas Ethiopia was committing suicide with regard to securing access to the sea.
When it comes to key national interest philosophies do not work. The most democratic state in the world did not hesitate to invade Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan when it felt that US national interest was compromised. China who taught TPLF about self-determination up to cessation is closely watching Taiwan. It is always prepared to stop any declaration of independence in Taiwan. So does Somalia which did not allow Somaliland to be independent and is preparing to stop Ethiopia from recognizing it. When the going with plan-A got tough in Eritrea, Mengistu devised a plan-B to secure access to the Red Sea, in case Eritrea becomes independent. In 1987 he redrew the regional boundaries of Ethiopia and created a new region merging the Afar lands in Eritrea, Tigray and Wollo. The new region was named Assab and included half the length of the Red Sea coastline. The rest was left for Eritrea which was given the status of an “autonomous region”. The strategy looked like allowing Eritrean independence without the new Ethiopian Assab Region. There is a lot of logic in this; the whole world has accepted colonial borders for the former colonies in Africa. If Eritrean struggle was for freedom from “Ethiopian colonialism” Ethiopia needed to play by the Eritrean rule of the game for its own advantage although it did not subscribe to the colonial narratives defining the war in Eritrea. It follows logically that it is the border delineated by the last colonizer that become legal. The last „colonizer‟ was Ethiopia and Assab remains within the jurisdiction of Ethiopia while “the autonomous region of Eritrea” gets it independence with the northern half of the Red Sea coastline. In order not to lose Assab to Ethiopia Eritrea was choosing from among its colonizers. It chose Italy as its colonizer; but it was not the last! Was it? The Portuguese were the first to colonize Africa, but the borders of independent African states were drawn by their last colonizers: Britain and France. Eritrean struggle for independence cannot be both anti-colonial and none-anticolonial at the same time. If Eritreans want to adhere to the “Ethiopian colonialism” narrative they are obliged to endorse the border demarcation by the last colonizer: Ethiopia. If Eritreans fail to accept the arrangement they must abandon the reason that led to the struggle for independence: “Ethiopian colonialism”. If Eritreans abandon the “Ethiopian colonialism” narrative their status as an independent state will automatically be null and void. This logically leads Ethiopia to reclaim its sovereignty over Eritrea as the former 14th province of Ethiopia.
After disappointing Ethiopians, by failing them on their top most national interest, TPLF tried to “hide the elephant” of the .loss of access to the sea by rapid economic growth. Although the achievements in the economic field were extraordinary they were not sufficient for Ethiopians to embrace TPLF. TPLF did not rein over Ethiopia for three decades just for its achievements in the economic field. The army and the security apparatus it built, in addition to the leaders and their associates amassing wealth, did not allow disgruntled Ethiopians to remove TPLF from its absolute power over Ethiopia. Immediately before and soon after the “Badme War”, in which ungrateful Eritrea invaded Ethiopia, significant voices against “TPLF‟s standpoint about Eritrea” were increasing in volume. Iron-hand leaders of the TPLF, Meles Zenawi and Sebhat Nega, were playing down the threat from Eritrea on Ethiopia in general and on Tigray in particular. The rebels, which included heavy-weights in the army and the Party’s central committee broke the ice of TPLF‟s “love is blind” with the Eritrean cause. Although too late, the splinter group in the TPLF realized that babysitting Eritrea was the most disastrous mistake TPLF has ever committed. Italians were awarded Eritrea; but what they really wanted was the whole of Ethiopia. They invaded Ethiopia and this led to the Battle of Adwa. Eritreans were awarded an independent Eritrea, but like their former colonial master what they really wanted was the whole of Ethiopia. Eritreans invaded Ethiopia and this led to the bloody “Badme War”. Even if TPLF tried hard to smoke screen what most Ethiopians think was a sellout of their access to the sea it could not succeed to maintain its balance in power at Arat Kilo any further than the tumultuous 27 years. Uprising of the Oromo youth, driven from behind by those sickened by TPLF;‟s political drama, so easily swept it from power. Enfeebled TPLF survived the latest Tigray War at the cost of millions of lives. The irony is that TPLF is too stubborn to learn from its own fatal mistakes and it is still associating itself with Eritrea:
PM Abiy’s Persistent Campaign for Ethiopia’s Access to the Sea
The issue of access to the sea for Ethiopia has reached its climax of complexity. PM Abiy is poking here and there to find a soft spot to secure access to the sea. In the last few months he has become boldly vocal about access to the sea, with a tone that alarmed neighboring countries. PM Abiy talked about „carrot and stick‟ with Eritrea on the Assab question, which turned the brief friendship between PM Abiy and President Isaias into almost open quarrel. In a desperate move to gain access to the sea for Ethiopia PM Abiy did something that is morally acceptable but diplomatically disastrous: MOU with Somaliland. What PM Abiy signed in the MOA is just to acquire only a 20 km stretch of coastal land on the basis of a 50 years lease. What Ethiopia agreed to give Somaliland in return is quite big: A share in its giant national corporations and recognition of Somaliland as an independent state. By this agreement Ethiopia stepped on a diplomatic landmine angering Somalia and triggering a myriad of alliances against it. Former leaders of Ethiopia surrendered a thousand kilometers of coastline without caring to think about the future. Now Ethiopia is in deep trouble for a small coastal strip in Somaliland. Ethiopia deserves a great deal of sympathy for its predicament as world’s largest landlocked state.
The political game on Ethiopia’s access to the sea continues. It is not who is trying to get sea access for Ethiopia that matters; it could be the angel or the devil. What matters most is Ethiopia’s desperate need for access to the sea. Somebody has to get it! In Ethiopia armed opposition to the PP-led government of Abiy Ahmed is everywhere. When Abiy Ahmed jumped into a diplomatic trap, just for the sake of acquiring sea access for Ethiopia, alliance against Ethiopia was forged by Egypt, Somalia and Eritrea (ESE-Axis). This was considered as a godsend opportunity for the opposition to remove the Prime Minister. Isn’t this a litmus test for the often pretended patriotism of Ethiopians? For more than a century leaders in Ethiopia have been putting power politics before national interest at least when it comes to Ethiopia’s access to the sea. Strange news was being released from every direction in which the opposition to Abiy in Ethiopia and the ESE-Axis were on the same page. While the ESE-Axis spokespersons vowed to support opposition groups in Ethiopia, the latter reciprocated by refusing to involve in any of “Abiy’s regional wars”. The opposition, who are expected to do better in the effort to get sea access for Ethiopia should have assisted Abiy Ahmed rather than embarrassing Ethiopia in front of the world public by their conformity with the enemies of Ethiopia. Abiy Ahmed, a dictator or not, the opposition must rally behind the quest for access to the sea. A seat in parliament or a throne at Arat Kilo is a means not an end; and that end goal is Ethiopia’s access to the sea. Eritrea like in the Aesop fables is acting like the metaphorical fox who said: “The grapes are sour”. Egypt’s foremost agenda is GERD not Ethiopia’s sea access in Somaliland. It is using every available opportunity to disable Ethiopia from using the GERD effectively.
Where Tigray Stands is Crucial
In view of its geographical position vis-à-vis access to the Red Sea political standpoint in Tigray remains crucial. For many centuries Tigray was ruled by hereditary princes and warlords. The half-century of complete TPLF control in Tigray was different from the feudal past in form not in content. The people of Tigray never had a say in the decision making about Ethiopia’s access to the sea. Unfortunately, the people are often hated and penalized for decisions made by their rulers past and present. After the bloody and devastating war in Tigray where do politicians stand on the issue of Ethiopia’s access to the sea? Apart from what is said and discussed in the social media it is not possible to conduct an opinion poll in Tigray. In view of the fact that Tigray is led more by the opinions of the political elite rather than by what ordinary people feel is the right thing to do, dominant narratives aired in the social media can somehow serve as a guide to where Tigray stands with regards to Ethiopia’s access to the Red Sea. After the war the point of departure for any opinion about Ethiopia in Tigray is how Tigrayans feel about Ethiopia. The common ground for all Tigrayans is that Ethiopia hurt them so severely that bad feelings about Ethiopia outweigh the good ones. There is a great deal of ambivalence among Tigrayans where the grudge they harbor about Ethiopia will take them to.
Substantial numbers favor independence from Ethiopia and many others dream of joining Eritreans in a single statehood or some form of federal arrangement. Significant numbers of Tigrayans prefer to remain as Ethiopians in spite of the fact that hate towards them persists in the Ethiopian society at large. Those who envisage an independent Tigray and/or a federated Tigray Tigrigni state see no logical reason at all to support Ethiopia’s access to the Red Sea, which they think will be in their own possession. How soon and how effectively the creation of a new Red Sea state will be realized is a very difficult question to answer. The absence of consensus among Tigrayans themselves on the subject, the horrendous crimes Eritreans committed in Tigray fresh in the minds of Tigrayans, and the pervasive and deep rooted repulsive attitude of Eritreans towards Tigrayans rules out the possibility of unification with Eritrea at least in the following decade or two. Tigray is nursing its deep grievances by politically, socially and psychologically distancing itself from Ethiopia. The economy (budget, commerce, investment, and employment) is what has held them together by a very thin thread. The danger of Tigrayan ambivalence with regard to Ethiopia and their dreams of a “kinship state” in the north is that they will continue to be irrelevant and always suspected in Ethiopia. Unless they reach a consensus about which way to go Tigrayans sitting on the fence and trying to keep their balance are going to end up divided and dispersed. This is also what Eritrea wishes to see: a Tigray that is not attended to and weak enough to be manipulated to cater for Eritrea’s ambitions over Ethiopia.
Ethiopia’s Access to the Sea: A Quest for Justice
French Judge and political philosopher Charles Montesquieu said: “There is no greater tyranny than that which is perpetrated under the shield of the law”. International law about states‟ access to the sea has been nothing but tyranny over Ethiopia. Who would argue in favor of a law that protects excesses of the few against starving millions? Being landlocked is detrimental to the development of a country. It loses direct access to maritime trade, which is vital to economic and social development. Development economist Paul Collier observed that “being landlocked in poorer regions of the world is one of the key development traps that hold countries back” In terms of land area Ethiopia ranks sixth among the 45 landlocked countries of the world; but it ranks first in terms of population. Here lies justice unattended. It is people that form the foundation for justice. Fair distribution on the basis the numbers of people should be at the roots of all international laws. It is not who grabbed it first, but who needs it most that should matter for justice to be served. Ethiopia stands first in the world by the number of its neighbors who have got their own seaports. Of the seven neighbors it shares international borders with six of them have sea-ports. According to the report issued by the World Monetary Fund, landlocked Ethiopia ranks sixth in terms of gross domestic product (GDP) in Africa, while the first five in the GDP rank (South Africa, Egypt; Algeria, Nigeria, and Morocco) all possess long coastlines.
It is well known to everyone that Ethiopia is not a darling of the colonial powers of Europe; it has embarrassed them on several occasions like no other African or Asian state ever did. They could not bear the thought that Ethiopia could be a “bad” example motivating Africa to fight for independence from European colonialism. Most probably that could be the reason why they locked Ethiopia in its highlands detached from the sea in all directions: Italian Eritrea along the Red Sea, Italian Somalia along the Indian Ocean, British Somaliland along the Gulf of Aden and Djibouti along the Gulf of Tadjoura. Ethiopia is not only the largest landlocked state in the world in terms of population. It is the home of a quarter of the total population of all the 45 landlocked states of the world, and half of the population of the 16 landlocked states of Africa. Ethiopia accounts for a third of the total GDP of the 16 landlocked countries of Africa. The 2024 estimate of the total population of the five neighboring coastal states (Sudan, Eritrea, Djibouti, Somalia and Kenya) is nearly the same (131M) as Ethiopia’s 135M. The five neighboring coastal states possess a total length of 7500 kilometers of coastline. Canada has the world’s longest coastline of 200,000kilometers. Canada’s population is only a third (40 M) of that of Ethiopia.
Kenya has a population exceeding 55M and a GDP ranking of seventh in Africa, next to Ethiopia, with 116B. Justice is well served for Kenya (a former British colony), which possesses a deserved 600 kilometers of coastline, in view of its population served and the GDP generated. The same goes for Sudan with a population of 50M possessing a coastline length of 850 kilometers. The remaining three neighbors of Ethiopia, that possess coastlines, were former colonies of Italy, Britain and France. The total GDP of the three coastal states is only 15 percent of Ethiopia’s GDP; but they are in possession of 6000kilometers of coastline. They were undeservedly awarded so much of the Planet’s resources, by the former colonial masters of the world; action which cannot be explained by what the small newly independent states could do with the excess at their disposal. In a press conference, former PM Meles Zenawi was quoted saying “Eritreans are not capable of using Assab to its full economic capacity. They can only have watering spots for their herds of camel”. Meles Zenawi was probably making fun of Eritreans possessing a total of 2300 kilometers of coastline (including the islands) and doing nothing with it. Was he doing justice when he knew that what he denied Ethiopia and awarded to Eritrea is something Eritreans cannot use? Is it justice to strip someone naked and give the dress to somebody else who cannot wear them?
Djibouti with a coastline over 300 kilometers long transits 95 percent of Ethiopia’s external trade, while its population is less than one percent of the total population of Ethiopia and its GDP less than three percent of that of Ethiopia. After independence Djibouti has never been a viable state. It survives by selling port service to Ethiopia while it imports its entire foodstuffs from Ethiopia. The Djibouti-Ethiopia picture bears a gruesome image where Djibouti’s ten fingers are “holding the throat” of Ethiopia. With a slight press on the „Adam’s apple‟ the livelihoods of 100M people will melt like wax in a few days. It is callousness to say the least for the international community to enjoy a good night’s sleep when such a catastrophe is imminent if no action is taken to solve the problem of Ethiopia’s access to the sea. It turned into a social media bonanza when PM Abiy talked about the dire consequences of the lack of access to the sea for Ethiopia. He forewarned the international community in these words: “Ethiopia will be forced to open the floodgates for millions of economic refugees inundating the Planet”. (The hyperbole is mine, but that was exactly what he meant).
The former colonial powers, who designed the huge geopolitical prison for Ethiopia by creating politically, demographically and economically unviable states to seal its access to the sea, knew perfectly well what they were doing to serve their interests in the future. The last thing they want to see is Ethiopia rising in the region as a power to be reckoned with. In addition, probably more important is their strategic interest in the Red Sea and the Middle East. In their confrontation with the former Soviet Bloc in the Middle East they knew they cannot arm-twist Ethiopia into providing them with military bases and missile sites. They have no reason to reverse their decisions this time around because there is still competition with China, Russia and among each other for a lion’s share in the Middle East and the Red Sea. Egypt is the ally of the West with its own historic agenda on Ethiopia. Egypt is playing a double role in the Horn of Africa: imposing its own Nile agenda on Ethiopia and protecting Western interest in the Middle East and the Red Sea. To counter this Gulf states and Turkey are trying to get a foothold in the region by courting the weak and helpless states of Eritrea, Djibouti and Somalia. Now the three coastal neighbors of Ethiopia have become a beehive of military and diplomatic activates to cater for the stiff competition between the superpowers and the rich Arab states of the Middle East. In the middle of the turmoil the hundred million Ethiopians are disregarded driving them against each other as the economy dives and poverty spreads.
Access to sea in the Horn of Africa, like in other parts of the world, is the outcome of colonial decision making. This has been converted into international law! The irony is how could the decision made by colonial powers be justice when everyone knows that colonialism never served justice in Africa for many centuries? The outcome of wrong cannot be right! What Ethiopia is suffering from is this very injustice. For Eritrea the thousands of kilometers coastline has become a white elephant. It is paying to guard it more than it earns by using it. It is a gross manifestation of international injustice in the sense that Eritrea is wasting a scarce resource and the world is turning a blind eye while Ethiopia suffers from the lack of it. The sick explanation to such injustice is “international law”. Eritrea was awarded over two thousand kilometers of coastline; but it is busy with military training of the youth for the last thirty years, interfering in the affairs of neighboring states in the region militarily while its people suffer abject poverty, dilapidation of its cities, and mass drowning of its youth in the Mediterranean Sea. With over 3000 kilometers of coastline Somalia has been a liability for the international community for well over half a century: a haven for terrorism and a land of curse where warlords fight, divide and re-divide it. So much of coastline is not only idle but also infested with pirates wreaking havoc on Indian Ocean shipping. Somalia has wasted the coastline economically speaking; but it sounds red alarm and starts singing sovereignty songs when Ethiopia utters a single word about using Somalia’s coastline. The ill humor is the UN, AU and the West join Somalia’s chorus: “Sovereignty, territorial integrity, etc”. Wasn’t it Ethiopia that sent its soldiers to die saving Somalia from disintegration?
A Way Forward
With regards to Ethiopia’s access to the sea the past has to be laid to rest. It is unhelpful, even dangerous, for Ethiopians to keep on incriminating one another for Ethiopia’s loss of access to the sea. The lack of wisdom and foresight has been unfathomable, but ruminating the past could weaken the resolve of Ethiopians, disabling their joint actions for a better future of access to the sea. Ethiopians must „take the bull by the horns‟ and be tough when the going gets tough. Redrawing of borders should not be a thing of the past. Political geography is a dynamic process; borders domestic or international have never been static and they will never be so. In this world where might is right it is how strong and united a state is that matters for imposing its key national interests on others. Like flowing water, international law erodes the weak. Ethiopia needs not transit ports but access to the sea that falls within its jurisdiction. For the sake of convenience for external trade from different parts of Ethiopia transit or some form of a lease arrangement can be negotiated with Kenya, Sudan, and Somalia; but Eritrea must be singled out for a special consideration as regards to Ethiopia’s historically justified access to the Red Sea.
The bottom line is, Ethiopia must be a Red Sea state, be it by sharing the Red Sea coastline for two or by reversing the independence of Eritrea into its pre-1991 status. This may be a diplomatic transgression, but certainly it is a moral imperative. Immanuel Kant took the imperative to be “a dictate of pure reason in its practical aspect”. The „blue print‟ that underlay Eritrean independence from Ethiopia, which was Eritrea’s economic core-periphery relations with Ethiopia, has failed miserably though at an enormous cost. The failure of the strange „blue print‟ has perpetuated a dictatorship in Eritrea in the absence of an alternative path to self-reliant development in Eritrea. The disastrous outcomes of the failure were not restricted to Eritrea alone; Eritreans have spread all over the region and beyond and are messing up economies and social life of the host countries. Eritrea and Eritreans need a merciful intervention by Ethiopia. The rhetoric about peaceful dealing with Eritrea is aggravating arrogance against Ethiopia in general and the Tigray region in particular. Eritrean politicians and ordinary people alike have become like a hot potato on the hand of Ethiopia; to throw them or to hold them being equally difficult. However complex the Eritrean situation is and however much intervention from Ethiopia is needed Eritreans want the Ethiopia-Eritrea status quo to be maintained. Eritreans in the PFDJ and in the opposition have one thing in common: they are determined to secure the independence of Eritrea at whatever cost to Ethiopia. Eritrean opposition is seeking support from Ethiopia and from Tigray as well. It is hard to paint a scenario of a post-PFDJ Eritrea; but I would rather be proved wrong by exercising caution with regard to the opposition at the Asmara Palace than to allow trust and optimism to blind my judgment. Ethiopia must take the liberty to break the diplomatic permafrost with Eritrea and secure access to the Red Sea by a soberly calculated mix of carrot and stick.
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