Politics and Economics Underlying Ethnic Identity in Ethiopia

During the EPRDF-years in Ethiopia ethnic identity appeared on official IDs to the elation of many ethnicity-based politicians and to the dismay of many more who found the display of ethnic identity on their official documents inconvenient and even harmful. The identity documents which displayed ethnic background were largely ‘kebele’ IDs of residence. There was almost no logical explanation as to why ethnic identity should appear on IDs which serve only to indicate that the bearer of the ID card is just a resident of a particular kebele or wereda of a city or town. Any human being residing in that particular wereda, regardless of race, linguistic or cultural background is both entitled and obliged to carry that ID. What value would that add to security checks and banking services for instance, unless it is meant for some political vice to privilege some and marginalize others in a corrupt and nepotistic administrative apparatus and in the provision of vital public services?

Even the document which is intended to prove claims of citizenship requires some information which hints ethnic identity. Ethiopian Passports have place of birth of the holder indicated in upper-case font. Wherever a person is born, be it in Moyaleor Selale matters little to the required identification of citizenship. Ethiopian citizenship may as well be given to anyone born in any part of the world. The people of Ethiopia never demanded their ethnic identity to be indicated in their identity documents; it is governments who have been pushing for that. This implies that the public display of ethnic identity has emanated from political and economic interests of the political and economic elite. The subject will be discussed in greater details in the later sections of the article. First and foremost let us unravel the enigma of what has been idolized as “the pride of ethnic identity”.

There is no harm in pride derived from particular ethnic identity as long as it does not inflict harm on other identities. Nobler and admirable is the pride emanating from achievements in science and technology as opposed to just belonging to a particular social group. Ethnic identity, fueled by political and economic interests, is pushing Ethiopia into the abyss. Ethnic politics has become like drug addiction from which withdrawal becomes very difficult requiring long and painful rehabilitation and death from it
becomes inevitable. It is also analogous to a quick-sand which swallows its blind-folded adherents unless a timely action is taken by the victim before both hands are hopelessly devoured by the whirling sand. The power of ethnic politics in Ethiopia has become so immense that it has become institutionalized and deeply inculcated in the minds of the ordinary people. People in Ethiopia are so possessed by the
demons of ethnic politics so much that they don’t realize they are killing the Nation they love so dearly.

The propaganda barrage from the ubiquitous media is intoxicating people with the ethnic politics of hate and revenge. A Nationwide alarm must sound awakening people to the tragedy that their ship is sinking. When Titanic started to sink and reached almost half way people in the ship were singing and dancing. They failed to notice the tremors and noises made by collapsing and falling parts of the gigantic ship.

In the theory of creation God created Adam and then Eve. The entire seven billion humans is the result of the love shared between the two primordial creatures of God. The evolutionist version of the story of human origin traces the millions of years of hominid advancement into the Homo sapiens sapiens. Be it through creation or evolution we are here as members of the same species except the phenotypes (superficial features) that distinguish us as differing racial stocks.

Science has proved beyond doubt that human beings are essentially the same in terms of their fundamental physical traits. This implies that whatever differences we have are socially constructed. The question: “What are you?” has only one answer. That is, “I am a human being”. This question is to distinguish you from other plant and animal species, not from your own kind. The “what” question
pertains to natural identity, which is static. The other question is: Who are you? This question is asked not to distinguish you from a tiger, for instance, but from another human being. The most basic answer to
this question comes from the individual. One may be required to tell his/her name.

From personal identity the question “who” may seek answer at a higher tier (membership of a group) such as religion, race, some cultural or linguistic group or belongingness to some geographical region. As ethnic identity is defined by one or more of the aforementioned identity markers it is more likely to have fluid boundaries and imprecise taxonomy. The key problem with boundaries is the overlapping markers which multiply expectations on the individual from groups categorized based on various criteria. One may be a Muslim, speaker of a particular vernacular language, and native of a particular region or locality. The
individual, with multiple criteria for self-identification is expected by each group to behave in a certain way befitting group identity indicators. This is where the crisis of ethnic identification reveals itself. There are two most often conflicting bases for ethnic identification: How you identify yourself and how others identify you. You may behave in a certain way based on your own ethnic identification; but others may expect you to behave in another way and brand you as a deviant if you don’t conform. The civil war in Ethiopia has witnessed such conflict in identity.

When the Tigray War was ongoing natives of the Region wherever they resided were expected to support the Tigray-side. However, there were natives of Tigray who played significant role on the opposite side against all expectations. Leaving aside those who had other strictly personal motivations many based their actions on how they identified themselves not how others in “their” Region identified them
and expected them to behave. Natives of Tigray identify themselves either as Tigrayan first and Ethiopian next or Ethiopian first and Tigrayan next.

The dualism in self-identification is also common among natives of other regions and localities.
The inherent imprecision in ethnic identification and the expected behavior is also revealing itself in the war in the Amhara Region where Amhara are fighting from both sides. The Fano, feeling that they fully represent the “Amhara cause”. expect all Amhara to join their ranks against what they often declare is an “Oromo Government”. The Amhara versus Oromo dichotomy, run by the Fano, did not succeed to rally all Amhara to their side of the war. A huge number of significant personalities native to the Amhara Region have stood firmly against the Fano. Dualism and the deviation from the expected behavior also pervades religious grouping. Let us take two examples from Tigray and the Amhara Region. During the Tigray War Muslims and Christians suffered equally, and they were in the same trenches in the arduous war of defense. Both Muslims and Christians accused their leaders in Addis Ababa for not helping them. When a critical decision had to be made Muslims switched sides to what they felt was a more important ethnic
identification marker. Christians in Tigray severed ties with the synod in the Capital. “As Tigrayans” Muslims in Tigray were expected to do the same; because it was felt by Christian Tigrayans that what unifies them as Tigrayans is more important than the religion that divides them.

In many cases the conflict between ethnic self-identification and group expectation in Ethiopia takes some strange forms. In the past, even in some cases in the present, it has been common for individuals to self-identify themselves as Amhara while their ethnic markers clearly indicate they were not. The unexpected self-identification may be an expression of submission to the assimilationist pressure by a demographically or economically or politically dominant group. It has also been self-imposed without any external pressure. There are some who by birth belong to other ethnic groups but proudly identify themselves as Amhara; and have become staunch advocates for the “Amhara cause”.

Ethnic identification as Eritrean versus Tigrayan has become a complex issue marred by violence. Tigray and the densely populated highland region of Eritrea (Kebesa) is identified as a Tigrigna speaking area. It is also culturally homogenous region where Orthodox Christianity is the dominant faith of the population. What else would you need to categorize the people residing in this region as belonging to the same ethnic group? Adding reinforcement to the set of ethnic building blocks is the shared Axumite heritage of a civilization that spanned for a thousand years. For Tigrayans in the Tigray Region this is more than enough to put both Eritreans and Tigrayans in one ethnic box as “Tigrayans”. This is the expectation but not the reality. Except for some Eritreans who for political or social reasons endorse the Tigrayan identity most Eritreans prefer to identify themselves as Eritrean as opposed to being Tigrayan. The attitude of Eritreans towards a Tigrayan identity does not end only in rejecting it. It goes too far to a deep-seated propensity to destroy Tigrayans. Eritreans almost invariably feel that Tigrayans are existential
threat to Eritreans. What Tigrayans think about Eritreans is diametrically opposite to the hatred harbored, by Eritreans against them, for decades.

Although in the last war Eritrean troops supported financially and morally by Eritreans at home and in the diaspora demographically and economically devastated Tigray beyond repair, Tigrayans naively and stubbornly seek to restore the “brotherly and sisterly” relations with Eritreans. It is not easy to determine
whether the one sided craving for reunion emanates out of sheer nostalgia for the shared Axumite legacy and the dream of reliving it or the great deal of helplessness Tigrayans feel from the sandwiched geopolitics between a belligerent Eritrea in the north and its ages old hostile competitor in the south. Whichever of the two is the prime motivator for Tigrayans seeking Eritrean embrace as kins is not consensual.

Although all Tigrayans, as members of a single ethnic group are expected to feel the same way on the matter, not all Tigrayans share the call for Tigrayan-Eritrean unity. There are some clear and blurred patterns within the Tigrayan society as pertains to the Tigrayan-Eritrean reunion. One pattern is a north-south divide in which the north shares stronger social and economic ties with the residents of the Eritrean Kebesa, while the southern half of Tigray is more inclined towards the Ethiopian side of the spectrum. The lack of consensus threatens to rip the Region apart in the form of splits in the ranks of the TPLF and the opposition parties as well.

We have ample evidence to prove that ethnic identification is not about putting people in a pigeonhole. A rigid boundary between ethnic identities does not exist although this is what the political and business elites want to see. Several scholars on ethnicity, which is a concept depicting belongingness to a particular ethnic group and behaving accordingly, have determined that ethnic identity is not a
categorical category. It is rather transactional and layered. Ethnic self- identification, which is more authentic than external identification, depends on social and geographical context. People define their ethnic identity depending on who they are interacting with and where. When two individuals meet in a New York City Café this is how they most likely identify themselves. When one asks the other who he/she is the obvious answer would be “I am African”. The person who asked may also say “He/she is Australian”. The conversation about ethnic identity ends there and talk about city traffic jam or the weather continues. Other details of second or third tier identities are irrelevant.

The next layer of Ethnic identity is revealed only when two people who identify themselves as Africans for the rest of the American society interact. When two Africans meet in America it is not sufficient to identify oneself as African. Identifying oneself one tier down as Ethiopian and Kenyan is adequate. It is
meaningless for a Kenyan in USA to hear an Ethiopian say “I am Amhara or a Hamer”. In Addis Ababa two Ethiopians would never tell each other that they are Ethiopians. Ethnic identification descends one more tier down and being a Somali, a Wolaita, or Gumz becomes the next layer of Ethnic self-identification. Note that this is not a formula. Politically driven anomalies, to the generally held truth about ethnic identification as transactional and layered, exist. Politically motivated Oromos may never identify themselves as Ethiopian in the USA. This is true for many Tigrayans and Amhara who prefer to tell the world wherever they are that they identify themselves with the third tier ethnicity. Domestic politics in Ethiopia takes within-Ethiopia ethnic differences to great distances in America and Europe creating confusion among the public. People who immigrated as Ethiopians with an Ethiopian passport claim to be Amhara or Agew even after they hold American citizenship. This is the absurdity of ethic identification motivated by political and economic interests.

Another layer of Ethnic identity is revealed when two individuals from the Amhara Region meet in Bahir Dar for instance. None of the two identify as Amhara; one would proudly claim to be a Gondere and the other a Gojjame. The identities are never negotiable. The claims are accompanied by baseless feelings of superiority by one over the other. There are all kinds of narratives that put Gonderes over and above Gojjames or the vice versa. This is worse in Tigray where Tigrayans are considered by outsiders to be monolithic. Tigrayaness has also its lower tiers of ethnic identification accompanied by mutual mistrust and devoid of love and respect for each other. Unless there is some real threat to their existence shared by all Tigrayans that could unify them wherever they reside inside or outside Tigray, conflicts abound among Tigrayans regardless of their residence far away from home.

Ethic identification inside Tigray ridiculously follows the patterns of the long and devastating internecine wars that raged in the last century. The dukedoms that evolved from the battles fought for territory, between feudal warlords of various levels, crystallized into administrative units which effectively divided
people and happily determined their lower-tier identities. It is the mother of ironies in Tigray that the administrative geography carved out by the oppressive rulers of Tigray are serving as dividers adopted willingly by the ordinary people. Traditional songs in Tigray don’t please people unless the names of their respective home localities are mentioned: Shire, Enderta, Adwa, Raya, Agame, Axum, Tembien.
These are the real identity markers among Tegaru that have been messing up social and political relations in Tigray for over a century, and up to this very day.

Analysts and ordinary folks alike feel that politically and economically motivated ethnicity is a recent phenomenon in Ethiopia. Most agree that it is the advent of Tigrayan-led rule of the EPRDF that glorified ethnic identification to a hazardous level. Ethnic identification was institutionalized and structuralized in the constitution and in the consequent administrative regionalization of the Country.

Once the novel political and social developments, emanating from the constitution, got into the hands of the broad masses they were confused and abused to the extent of rendering Ethiopia ungovernable. Of course, ethnic identification existed during previous regimes; but their expressions had little legal ground even at the level of the Civil Code let alone at grand level in the form of a constitution and ethnicity-
based regionalization. Ethnicity on its own has little value to societies. It is economic life first and politics
next that harvest it. Our primitive ancestors created groups not for its own sake but to share the hardships involved in making a living.

The groups getting larger and larger into clans, tribes, nations, etc. as the competition for resources went beyond the vicinity of their cave dwellings involving large groups of competitors from far and near. At higher levels of social organization of societies’ economic competition was accompanied by competition for political power. Competing leaders sought the support of what they called their ‘own kind’ intentionally widening social chasms in societies. Politicians in the past and present prey on ethnic differences as selection to leadership based on merit gradually withered
away. Use and abuse of ethnic identity for political and economic benefits was not the outcome of the work of great minds. Men and women of confidence in their own talents do not lean to their ethnic flock. Ethnicity based politics and economic life has always wreaked havoc to nations because it is the republic of the weak and the wicked. During the Monarchy ethnicity was subdued as a result of the absence of economic and political motives to drive it or absolutist rule never allowed its expression.

Over 90 percent of the people of Ethiopia resided in the rural areas eking out subsistence level livelihoods. Being in their respective farm-steads there was little room for inter-ethnic conflict except for some tribal or clan skirmishes in the pastoralist border areas. With a weak urban economy competition for the market and investment resources was not so keen to seek support from “fellow’ emigrant ethnic kin. In the final years of the Monarchy there were signs of mutual support based on ethnicity in the forms of urban ethnic enclaves: Teklehaymanot sefer, Wello sefer, the Gurage cluster of Mercato. These were just benign areas of convenience meant for easier access to traditional food and sharing of other facilities.

There was one politically motivated ethnic based grouping: the embryo of Oromo nationalist movement named “Mecha Tulema”. Other uprisings in Bale, Gojjam, and Tigre were driven more by class oppression rather than by ethnic grievances.

The roots of ethnic politics can be traced back to the years of Ethiopian student movement. It did not evolve in the wombs of the political, social, and economic life of the Ethiopian societies; it was just the outcome of analysis based on Marxist philosophy. It was a jinni pulled out of a jar and became too big to be re-sealed. Initially, Ethiopian student movement was manned by activists from almost all ethnic backgrounds. They all agreed that Monarchial rule, running an archaic feudal economic and social system, must end for good. There was little ambiguity in this regard: It was class struggle. In those years personal friendships crossed ethic divides and it was considered to be backward for “birds of a feather to flock
together”. In the midst of the student movement years one of the top leaders of the movement introduced a Marxist interpretation of ethnic identity politics in Ethiopia which cut across the homogenous landscape of class struggle. The new but divisive rallying cry did not manage to divert the momentum that class struggle was gathering. The demise of the Monarchy became a reality, but there was little consensus about how to go on from there.
It was at this juncture in the history of Ethiopia that ethnic politics crept into the hitherto monolithic class struggle against oppression. What started as mass uprising for economic and social justice for all ended up in Military rule. What came to be known as the February Revolution failed to live up to its historic
expectation of empowering the oppressed masses of Ethiopia. The failure of the class struggle provided sufficient justification for ethnic sentiments to pervade the then turbulent political atmosphere in the Capital. Oromos from Wellega made the first move by posting a memo in the main campus stating that “the oppression of 18 million Oromos must come to an end”. This was in the first half of 1974.

Behind the memo was the formation of the Oromo Liberation Front. Next in the line was Tigray nationalism led by activists from Adwa. They used the chaos and frustration following the advent of Military rule to rally the people of the former Tigre Governorate General behind their nationalist agenda.
Although the Military regime took bold steps that enhanced the class struggle by a series of proclamations it lacked a clear road-map to shape the future of Ethiopia except for keeping itself busy with refining its Marxist ideology.

The era of Marxism in Ethiopia was ushered with the “war of interpretations” taking
thousands of lives. In the two decades of political mess in Ethiopia none other than TPLF of Tigray became the trail blazer and the paramount leader of ethnic politics in the Country. Following the example of OLF and TPLF ethnic liberation movements proliferated without any common ground to cater for the common destiny as Ethiopians. This was left to the Military regime to play with. Ethiopia may be more than the sum total of its ethnic constituents; but the supra-ethnic unity of Ethiopia had little ideological and institutional scaffolding. Ethiopianess as a cross cutting identity was just a skeleton of its former self ready to fall apart with any slight miscalculation. In a situation where ethnicity overcrowded the political
frequencies in Ethiopia the Military regime was left with little option other than violence to keep Ethiopia in one piece. Ethiopia existed only in the palace and in the embassies abroad.

Seventeen years after the failure of the February Revolution and the installation of the Military regime over twenty pieces of Ethiopia came to a meeting in Addis Ababa to work on how to fit the pieces into making a “new” Ethiopia free of ethnic oppression. It was hard to understand who was oppressing who. If there was Amhara oppression over the rest during the Monarchy it had lost its institutional foundation seventeen years ago. If land ownership was at the center of Amhara oppression over the ethnic groups in the south, west and east the “land to the tiller” proclamation had marked the end of that state of affairs. If the ethnic liberation movements that assembled in the second half of 1991in Addis Ababa were basing their big decisions, on how Ethiopia should be governed, on the history of oppression it is clear that they would go all wrong. Make no mistake! The seventeen years of armed struggle was to remove a dictatorial Military regime not against some phantom national oppressor.

The assumption that Amhara had continued to be national oppressors after they lost all the economic means to do so in 1974-75 is baseless. The years in Ethiopia under Military rule have seen the massacre of youth who were members and sympathizers of EPRP. It is well known to everyone that EPRP drew most of its membership and support from the Amhara. If an institutionally based Amhara oppression had continued during the Military regime it will never kill its own kind. In fact EPRP was strictly a supra-ethnic political movement which believed in shaping Ethiopia for all. It was its full trust on Marxism and the violence involved in its approach that ended the struggle of the youth with amazing determination. Faulty approach devoured an entire generation of gallant fighters for freedom of all Ethiopians. EPRP failed because ethnic liberation became the order of the day.

The transitional conference in 1991 decided on an administrative arrangement for Ethiopia in which ethnic groups become ‘shareholders in the huge company called Ethiopia’. A federal constitution was instated in which ethnic groups were amalgamated as autonomous entities with a great deal of powers in their respective administrative geographical regions. In previous regimes administrative regionalization was based on significant natural dividers, like river valleys. The assumption was that all Ethiopians belonged to the same ethnic group as Ethiopians. Natural boundaries only marked the end and the beginning of ease of movement for administrative purposes. Regionalization using natural boundaries
did not remain just mere physical phenomenon; it had its long-term and lasting impacts on the social cohesion and separation of the population in each administrative region. Since Amharic was used as an official language for all to communicate with, the fact that a particular region included several ethnic groups within its boundaries did not pose administrative problems of any significance.

The federal constitution used the easiest but the most problematic criterion for ethnic regionalization: language. The evolution of regional and sub-regional identity as ethic identity never considered language as a criterion. For this reason native Amharic speaking parts of Ethiopia had multiple sub-regional identities as more potent dividers than the use of Amharic as a unifier. Wello, Gondar, Gojjam, and Shewa are separated by historic criteria more than they are united by Amharic as a mother tongue. The same thing is true to Tigray where stronger expressions of ethnic identity rest on the historic administrative sub-regions (Adwa, Enderta, Agame, Shire, Raya, and Tembien) more than they are united by the Tigrigna
language. Distinct differences in dialects within the Amharic, Tigrigna and Afan Oromo speaking population has been a powerful intra-regional divider. It is common to observe people with sub-regional identities mocking one another about dialects. It is such powerful sub-regional identities that are mechanically lumped into single “regional states” based just on the weaker language criterion. If the
foundation is weak the building will certainly be weak; so are the regional states.

If people in the respective regional states don’t use the regions as their ethnic identity markers and do not derive special benefits who is the beneficiary from such a lame administrative geographic arrangement? Are ordinary Tigrayans, Amhara, and Oromos better off after the new regionalization and the federal constitution than they were before? It is claimed by the proponents of ethnic regionalization and the federal arrangement that regions have made significant progress in the social and economic spheres as opposed to what unitary arrangements during previous regimes were able to attain. However, this cannot be verified and confirmed because the basis for comparison doesn’t exist.

Regional development in war time is not comparable with development during peace time. One would be required to perform a counter factual analysis assuming that war did not happen in Tigray during the Military regime. In this case development in Tigray during the Military regime and the EPRDF rule could be compared. In spite of the rapid economic growth registered in the regional states the lives of the majority of the ordinary people have deteriorated. Ethnic regionalization was meant to empower people of the regions to manage their own economic, political and social affairs. This implies that politicians native to the regions will be eligible to take public positions at all levels. The assumption is that regional affairs are better managed by natives who have adequate knowledge of the culture and language of the region. How valid is this assumption? Does a Tigrayan or an Amhara or an Oromo politician or judge or administrator or teacher perform better serving the people in their respective regions than an “outsider” would? In theory the answer is “Yes’; but in practice the answer is “No”. In all regional states in
Ethiopia natives of ethnic regions have been even worse for the people than any outsider to the region could possibly be. If this is unfortunately the case why should regionalization be based on ethnic identity and regional affairs be managed by natives alone?

Time and circumstances have proved beyond doubt that ethnic, political and economic elite are the sole beneficiaries of the regionalization and federal arrangement based on ethnic criterion. However the burden of protecting and providing political support base for the elite falls on the ordinary people. In Tigray a million people perished and the livelihood of survivors devastated to protect the ruling elite threatened by its competitors for Federal power. Same is happening in the Amhara Region where the ambitions of the Amhara elite for Arat Kilo is wreaking havoc the lives of the ordinary people in the Amhara region. In Oromia there is no logic underlying the fight between Oromos if empowering the Oromo people were at the center of the political agenda. Ethnic politics and economics grew on the tombstone of meritocracy. Under normal circumstances individuals are selected for public positions at all levels based on the relevant education and experience. Royal blood or high birth from within the family circle of the sovereign determined who gets what during the Monarchy, and loyalty to the military leader and to the “revolution” also were key criteria for employment and appointment during Military rule. However, social mobility involved a certain level of meritocracy both during the Monarchy and the Military.

The worst the EPRDF years did was for ethnic regionalization and federalism to bury meritocracy several meters deep. This happened because ethnic politics which is run by the weak and the mediocre cannot survive under a full-fledged meritocracy. Parasitic to the ethnic arrangement of politics and power are the business elite who earn high profits by creating ethnic markets for their businesses evading free competition. Depending on who is in power ethnic affiliations give undue benefits to the business elite: access to hard currency, loans, and contracts. That is why every business elite in every ethnic group at all costs tries to get politicians within their ethnic group to key decision making positions. There are
also secondary parasites in the media and even in the fine arts who make an indecent living by aggrandizing their ethnic fellows and dumping the moral of their competitors.

In a unitary system of government the regional elite is at a greater disadvantage; in an ethnic federalism and regionalization for self-rule the regional and local elite is the beneficiary. What the ordinary people need to have is not in both arrangements. Some balance must be stricken between the two extremes in which the people could be sufficiently empowered. Ethnic politics is a politics of poverty. With social and economic progress for all the need for ethnic identification and the politics associated with it disappears on its own. Ethnic walls are destroyed and economic bridges built to allow free mixing of people. In the course of the evolution of national markets people spontaneously select a language for interaction. Commonalities and similarities will abound as differences diminish. As we are citizens of the world in a globalizing Planet it is sheer ignorance to dwell in trivial ethnic differences and fail to see the bigger and more beneficial picture.

Ethiopia can survive, thrive and join the world community as a reasonably developed state if through methods of carrot and stick it prevents ethnic politics from digging its grave. This requires national consultation of those who would like to see Ethiopia at least in the next century alive and kicking. Ethnically motivated civil wars are slowly but surely depleting the social fabric that binds Ethiopians.
Ethiopians are missing the opportunity to be a regional power and we have become
the laughing stock of even the tiniest of our neighbors. How is it possible for rationally thinking Ethiopian to love Ethiopia and at the same time facilitate its demise for purely selfish reasons?

Amhara: Existential Threat, Fight for Survival & Recommendations