Introduction
The Amhara people are facing multiple existential threats from the federal government and neighboring regions. Particularly in some parts of the Oromia region, they have been subjected to massacres, especially after Abiy Ahmed came to power. Additionally, there are territorial disputes with the Tigray region. Ethiopian politics is primarily based on ethnic identity, and the Amhara people supported Abiy, who claims Oromo ethnicity, during his rise to power. They also fought alongside the Ethiopian and Eritrean governments against the Tigray region during the two-year-long conflict. Following the Pretoria deal, the Ethiopian government decided to provide disputed territory to Tigray mainly due to pressure from Western powers, especially the USA. The disbanding of Amhara special forces reinforces this claim. The recent forceful takeover of Raya by Tigray was long planned and was not a secret to those who follow Ethiopian politics. Additionally, ethnic profiling was conducted on travelers from the Amhara region to prevent them from entering the capital city, Addis Ababa, where the majority ethnicity is Amhara. The restriction on free travel for the Amhara people and measures such as the demolition of buildings under the guise of development and daily ethnic profiling are seen as evidence that the Abiy government is planning to change the capital city’s demographics and build a city or country that excludes the interests of the Amhara people. The general sentiment among the Amhara people is that they feel betrayed by Abiy’s actions and wish to overthrow the government in collaboration with other Ethiopian regions. In response, the local militia called Fano has been established and is currently fighting to defend the Amhara people, receiving significant support from the local population.
Plan of Abiy about Amhara
In the long run, the Ethiopian government wants to weaken the Amhara region to ensure no future challenges to its power after crushing the Tigray region by force. The first priority is to crush Fano and ensure no future opposition from the Amhara region. If this is unsuccessful, Plan B involves ensuring the region remains in a prolonged conflict as long as it does not spread outside the region. The assessment is that the region’s economy is weak, and people will question the struggle if the war is prolonged. Currently, students are not attending school in most parts of the region, and medical institutions are on the brink of collapse. Mothers are dying during childbirth without medical support. When the Ethiopian Defense Force is attacked or loses a battle with Fano, it retaliates against residents, as seen in the Gojjam and Marrawi massacres reported by Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International. Similar incidents have occurred in the Shewa, Wello, and Gonder zones of the Amhara region. Kidnapping travelers and demanding ransom is part of this plan to weaken the people’s economy and force Fano and the population to surrender.
Regarding the disputed territories between Amhara and Tigray, it is unlikely that Abiy genuinely wants to resolve the issue. He does not want to implement the Pretoria deal unless pressured by Western powers. He aims to be seen as an implementer of the Pretoria deal to receive financial and other aids. He does not want to give the territory to Amhara either. He prefers the dispute to continue to ensure that the two parties remain focused on each other, preventing any possible coalition that could threaten his power in the northern part of the country.
Generally, the initial government plan was to crush Fano within four weeks, but now almost nine months have passed. Given the guerrilla nature of the fighting and Fano’s immense popular support, crushing Fano is nearly impossible at least for now. Abiy tried using the Ethiopian Defense Force, drones, and paying local militias and police to fight against Fano, but the plan did not succeed. In my opinion, Abiy’s assessment of the war is now in Plan B. It is unlikely that Abiy will come to the negotiation table sincerely if he believes either Plan A or B is succeeding.
Assessment of Amhara Fano’s Nine-Month Struggle
Fano has made significant progress in these nine months. For a Guerrilla fighter like Fano, merely surviving for such a long time is itself a victory. Fano has grown stronger in terms of the number of fighters, logistics, and arm power. Gojjam and Wello are under unified command, and Gonder and Shewa are progressing similarly. Almost all commanders are active, except for one lost commander from South Gonder. Eventually, a unified command will emerge. The main strength of Fano is its immense support from the local population, which sustains the struggle.
If Fano wants to achieve its goal of overthrowing Abiy or forcing him to negotiate sincerely, the following measures should be taken by Fano and other parties:
- Maintain strong local support. The government may organize fake Fano groups to loot from the people; ensuring the people remain on board is crucial.
- Preserve Fano’s excellent intelligence capabilities to track the movement of Ethiopian Defense soldiers and identify government spies. These spies could come from any sector of society including religious leaders and women or anyone coming into the region in the name of visiting family and more.
- Coordinate with other Ethiopian regions and players with popular support, regardless of their political ideology. Coordination with Gumuz fighters is a good start. This includes OLA or OLF, TPLF as far as the assessment shows they have their own region people support. Efforts should be mutual, and coordination with foreign players is also crucial if it aids the struggle.
- Coming under one command center. Fano should not feel pressured to quickly unify without proper discussion, as this can lead to problems. However, it is crucial to eventually have a unified command, especially for the political wing that will prepare strategies and make preparations for negotiations if any arise in the future.
- The diaspora should limit its support to financial aid, strategic ideas, and diplomatic and economic pressure on the government. Recently, the American Ambassador indicated a lack of understanding of Fano’s struggle; explaining the situation to foreign powers is essential. Preventing the government from receiving funds or loans is crucial, as is highlighting that money will be spent on park development and arms purchases. Final political and military decisions should be left to Fano. Avoid direct remittance as the government faces a dollar shortage.
- Supporters of Fano should participate in peaceful struggles without endangering their lives, such as providing logistical support and identifying government income sources. For instance, using private banks instead of Ethiopian commercial banks.
- Ensure the suffering of the people is felt in other parts of the country, especially the capital. The recent incident in Bole is an example of how the government was pressured.
- Effective and timely public communication within Ethiopia and the international community, and effective use of media is crucial to counter the government’s propaganda.
- Reduce traceability and vulnerability to drone attacks by moving in small numbers or using tunnels like Gaza’s Hamas. These tunnels of course will be in rural parts of the region for now. Precautions should also be taken to avoid traceability since the government controls telecom companies and can track phone locations. If the government knows the phone number, it can identify the tele tower where the user is available while the phone is on, or it will record the last tele tower id when the phone was last shut down. Getting technology awareness to avoid vulnerabilities is crucial.
- Upgrade technological warfare capabilities, including jamming drones or performing cyberattacks. Building or importing small handmade drones could also be beneficial. The Ukrainian effort to build handmade drones serves as an example that we witnessed in the ongoing war. Importing can be done through Sudan, other neighboring countries, or even through airports using methods I won’t mention here. Now, the price of small drones is affordable even for individual usage. Just by observing their operations on YouTube or other streaming channels, it can be seen that they can be used in a short period of time. These efforts may require specific targeted people and intellectual support from within the country and the diaspora. For instance, if Fano had a small drone when Abiy was in Bahir Dar and use it, imagine the significant impact it could have had.
Conclusion
The Amhara people are enduring immense suffering in this ongoing war. It is crucial to shorten this conflict as quickly as possible. Fano should communicate its goals well to other Ethiopian regions and the international community, prepare strategy documents, and present negotiation or precondition points. Hopefully, this will be achieved once Fano’s political wing comes under one command, as recently mentioned by Eskinder. No Fano commander has expressed unwillingness to negotiate; they question Abiy’s trustworthiness, sincerity, and the right timing for negotiations. As far as I know, in principle, Fano supports negotiation.
The international community should pressure Abiy to negotiate sincerely. Otherwise, the recent massacres of non-combatants and the people’s suffering will continue, and this conflict may also spread to the Horn of Africa, with a high chance of neighboring countries’ participation. This will worsen the situation along the already tumultuous Red Sea corridor.
Every war ultimately ends in negotiations; this ongoing war will not be different. Ethiopians and the international community should support a peaceful resolution. Let peace be upon Ethiopia!